Iterative Combinatorial Auction for Two-Sided Grid Markets: Multiple users and Multiple Providers

Abstract

Heterogeneity and different ownerships of grid computing resources impose complexity in evaluating the market value of these resources Auction protocols are proposed to meet this challenge efficiently Auction models are also suitable for achieving better payoff and resource allocation for grid providers Grid users and providers are usually geographically distributed The number of users in grid computing could also be very high Hence models provide seamless support to multiple users and providers would be useful to promote grid computing In this paper we implement a novel First Price Open Cry auction ascending-bid auction that supports for multiple users and providers simultaneously We explain about i bundle generation resource packages by providers ii creating corresponding agents to bundles iii allowing users to choose their suitable bundles and iv clearing bundles through solving winner determination problem The simulation results predict when and how to map providers private values on resource bundles such that maximum revenue and better utilization of idle resources K